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Abstract:
Interwar fascism achieved sensational international reach through the 
appeal and circulation of a set of generic ideological norms and political 
practices. Therefore models of interpretations must accommodate 
alternative local interpretations, adaptations, and a wide range of varied 
outcomes in the process of its diverse local translations. In this article, I 
propose the new trans-discplinary mobility paradigm as a productive 
methodological extension of the transnational approach in fascism 
studies. I focus on the fluid dynamics of trans-national circulation of 
‘fascist’ ideas and political innovations, as well as on how these were 
perceived, (re-)interpreted, adopted/adapted by a wide set of local 
agents in interwar Europe. I employ a decentred, anti-literarist, and 
multi-directional mobility approach that analyses the history of interwar 
‘fascism’ as the messy net force of diverse, multivalent agencies, of 
interactions and frictions, in the end of creative translation and trial-and-
error. I argue that a focus on this mobility dynamic offers three 
advantages: first, it promotes the re-integration of diverse fragmented 
histories of interwar fascism; second, it is capable of exposing the 
dynamic co-production of the political history of ‘fascist’ over time and 
space; and third, it fosters a far better understanding of the reasons for 
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ABSTRACT
Interwar fascism achieved sensational international reach through the appeal 
and circulation of a set of generic ideological norms and political practices. 
Therefore models of interpretations must accommodate alternative local 
interpretations, adaptations, and a wide range of varied outcomes in the process 
of its diverse local translations. In this article, I propose the new trans-discplinary 
mobility paradigm as a productive methodological extension of the transnational 
approach in fascism studies. I focus on the fluid dynamics of trans-national 
circulation of ‘fascist’ ideas and political innovations, as well as on how these 
were perceived, (re-)interpreted, adopted/adapted by a wide set of local agents 
in interwar Europe. I employ a decentred, anti-literarist, and multi-directional 
mobility approach that analyses the history of interwar ‘fascism’ as the messy net 
force of diverse, multivalent agencies, of interactions and frictions, in the end of 
creative translation and trial-and-error. I argue that a focus on this mobility 
dynamic offers three advantages: first, it promotes the re-integration of diverse 
fragmented histories of interwar fascism; second, it is capable of exposing the 
dynamic co-production of the political history of ‘fascist’ over time and space; 
and third, it fosters a far better understanding of the reasons for the ideological 
travel and political traction of radical ideas and politics in interwar years. 
Mobility and fascism: between the generic and the dynamic
Fascism studies are at a fascinating intersection. After decades in the 
wilderness of untheorised survey studies and of conceptual laxity, George 
L Mosse’s important early theoretical insights were subsumed into 
sophisticated conceptual and analytical frameworks in the eighties and 
nineties by a fresh generation of scholars spearheaded by Stanley Payne 

































































and Roger Griffin.1 This eventually led Griffin, who had formulated a 
concise and hugely influential definition of the ‘fascist minimum’ in the 
early 1990s, to claim that a ‘new consensus’ had finally emerged in the fray 
of fascism studies around a definition of the fascist ideological minimum.2 
By reducing fascism to its ‘bare essentials’ – a distinct ideological amalgam 
of ‘populist ultra-nationalism’ and the ‘myth of palingenesis/rebirth’ -, 
Griffin extrapolated its ineliminable core that distinguished it from other 
preceding and contemporary adjacent political ideologies.3 Both the 
definition and the claim of a consensus did not go unchallenged of course;4 
but such was the clarity, efficacy, and heuristic power of Griffin’s premise - 
as well as the willingness of a considerable number of subsequent 
historians to adopt the term ‘fascism’ in generic terms, however 
conditionally5 - that even its fiercest critics made extensive references to it 
as a central plank of their alternative interpretations.
The polemic around the merits and demerits of the ‘new consensus’ raged 
on for some time.6 It produced a fair amount of supporting and dissenting 
literature, the latter criticising Griffin’s ‘fascist minimum’ as essentialist, 
inflexible in its adherence to bounded conceptual entities, and static.7 The 
criticisms raised by the French sociologist Michel Dobry have been to a 
significant extent shaped by his vehement opposition to the way that 
arguments about ‘generic’ fascism have been utilized by proponents of the 
so-called ‘immunity thesis’ within the particular French historiographical 
context.8 Nevertheless they underlined how the obsession with strict 
classificatory models obscured the fascinating histories of mobility and 
fluidity, intersection and interpenetration, between supposedly different 
categories, as well as different political and social actors that shaped – less 
through intent than through contingency – the history of radical politics 
across interwar Europe.9 
The ‘new consensus’ polemic has mercifully run out of steam, clearing the 
path for new perspectives on the multiple histories of ‘generic fascism’. Of 
these the transnational approach has arguably signalled the most exciting 
re-thinking and re-dimensioning of the field, premised on a shift away 
from the previously dominant idea that historical accounts of fascism had 
to be mapped onto national boundaries. Instead attention was drawn to the 

































































critical role of cross-border nodes, networks, and interactions that 
facilitated the diffusion of fascist ideas and political innovations in Europe 
and across the world.10 Here the pioneering work of Hans Rogger and 
Eugen Weber from the 1960s,11 and of Martin Blinkhorn in the 
early-1990s,12 which had engaged in fruitful and nuanced ways with the 
ideological and political intersections between conservative and fascist 
right in the interwar period, had already suggested a workable interpretive 
framework that embraced the fuzziness of the political boundaries between 
the two constituencies, albeit still largely understood as bound by national 
histories. But the transnational approach expanded the horizons of enquiry 
both geographically and conceptually, subsuming previously ignored or 
under-studied dynamics of contact, exchange, and conflict that perforated 
state borders. 
The transnational approach to fascism has not evaded entanglements with 
the earlier debates about ‘generic’ fascism and the ‘new consensus’. Kevin 
Passmore claimed that “[t]o treat fascism as a social movement in a 
transnational context is to buck the trend in studies of so-called ‘generic 
fascism’”.13 In contrast, Arnd Bauerkämper and Constantin Iordachi have 
approached the transnational paradigm in a more nuanced way as a 
productive methodological extension of, rather than departure from, some 
form of generic understanding of fascism.14 In this article, I seek to extend 
discussion of the inter- and trans-national dynamics of interwar fascism by 
taking on board trans-disciplinary insights from mobility theories.15 
According to Tim Cresswell, “mobility involves a fragile entanglement of 
physical movement, representations, and practices”.16 For a long time, the 
most dominant understanding of mobility revolved around the notion of 
diffusion.17 According to one of its pioneers, Everett Rogers, diffusion is “the 
process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels 
over time among the members of a social system”.18 The multi-disciplinary 
field of diffusionist research has generated evocative and powerful 
metaphors, such as the epidemiological notion of ‘contagion’;19 
predominantly spatial categories such as ‘neighbourhood effect’ and 
'spatial clustering’;20 ‘wave’, ‘cascade’, and 'demonstration effect’ of 
paradigm change;21 and ‘domino effects’.22 In spite of these and other 

































































variations, all genres of the diffusion model highlight patterns of spatial, 
social, political, economic or cultural interdependence and of spatial and 
temporal clustering,23 be that on a subnational or an international scale. 
Theoretically rooted in the social sciences, diffusion models have been 
applied to the study of policy transfer and regime change in the 19th and 
20th centuries. Juan J Linz was one of the first scholars to connect 
meaningfully the study of fascism with the broader context of regime 
transition and democratic breakdown in the interwar years.24 Kurt 
Weyland has productively studied the long-term dynamics of both 
democratisation and authoritarian ‘reverse waves’ in Europe and Latin 
America in the 19th and 20th centuries in ways that shed new light on 
comparative fascism studies, directly or indirectly.25 Some fascism scholars 
too have applied the diffusionist perspective to the study of the inter-
national circulation of radical/’fascist’ ideas and political innovations in 
the interwar period, in Europe and on a global scale.26 Nevertheless 
diffusionist approaches to fascism have generally been treated with 
suspicion. This is in part related to deeper methodological objections to 
their perceived essentialism and their teleological horizon derived from 
biased notions of supposed directional change that they implied, especially 
in the context of modernisation and democratic transition.27 Yet they have 
also been challenged on grounds that they reproduce assumptions about 
some kind of ‘generic fascism’ projected outwards from alleged 
prototypical manifestations - in Italy, Germany or both.  
In contrast, the new mobility paradigm builds on the diffusionist emphasis 
on circulation and movement, dynamic change and hybridities, while 
offering a much-needed corrective to earlier notions of a unidirectional 
flow of ideas ‘radiating’ from a supposed originator or innovation source 
to allegedly second-order local adopters.28 In so doing, the mobility 
paradigm provides an anti-essentialist toolkit to navigate historical 
unpredictability and fluidity without denying a degree of conceptual 
affinity between particular subsets produced through the circulation, 
reception, translation and/or revision of ideas and practices emanating in 
another place or time. Extending insights from the new mobility paradigm 
to the study of interwar radical ideologies and politics will not somehow 

































































settle the question of whether ‘fascism’ was a generic ideological-political 
entity or not. Nor will it explain by itself why particular radical ideas or 
policies were more popular than others, in particular places but not 
elsewhere, at particular moments in time, among particular political and 
social constituencies. But it does provide an alternative analytical 
perspective that shifts emphasis to dynamic, protean fluidity without 
denying altogether the influence of ideological clusters (as perceived by 
contemporaries rather than modelled by scholars ex post facto) in all these 
processes. It also enables a re-reading of the intellectual and political 
history of interwar ideologies and politics as a jumble of fragmented and 
fluid histories within a context of far broader (in scope and kind) 
interactions. This larger ‘universe’ of interwar radical politics, to use the 
term used by David Roberts,29 was both the hub and the dynamic upshot of 
multiple intersections – not just between ‘fascists’ but also involving other 
constituencies of the new and old right (more conventional authoritarians, 
radical conservatives etc), not to mention in a few cases sectors of the 
dissident left (e.g. planisme in Belgium and France). And just as we require 
an awareness of the broader context of radical ideological and political 
mobilities in order to assemble the dynamic histories of interwar fascism (a 
subset thereof), we also need to analyse how this subset of ‘fascist’ ideas 
and political innovations shaped the dynamic field of interwar radical 
politics as a whole. This perspective neither denies the utility of ‘conceptual 
cores’ and ‘ideological minima’ nor seeks to make the web of interactions 
fit delimited ideological/political entities. Instead it shifts attention to the 
circulatory processes of reception and (re)formulation/translation of ideas 
that challenged and very often transcended supposedly bounded 
conceptual and political entities, whether perceived as such at the time or 
extrapolated in hindsight. 
Consensus or not aside, there was something distinct about interwar 
‘fascism’, however we choose to define and demarcate it conceptually; but 
it was not the originality of any of its core ideas.30 Fascism’s distinctiveness 
lay elsewhere – in the inventive constellations of otherwise familiar ideas 
that it encompassed at the core of its discourse and political praxis. Rather 
than understanding these constellations as transmitted – a priori formed - 

































































from a geographic and political centre towards obliging audiences in the 
peripheries, this article draws attention to a much broader, dynamic, 
unpredictable, and decentred field of ideational mobility and diffusion that 
produced them – and, through them, shaped the history of interwar 
fascism. Human actors of diverse nationalities and, more importantly, 
ideological complexions were as central to these processes as mobile ideas 
of equally diverse derivation. These actors shared a perceived sense of 
profound crisis – of ‘civilisation’, mainstream politics, and national culture. 
They also held a mutual conviction that a different kind of radical politics 
was desperately needed in order to avert an impending catastrophe, even if 
they did not agree entirely on its precise optimal form and content. Their 
shared sense of a horrifying gap between how things were and how they 
ought to be that generated the stirring tension that made radical ideas flow 
fast and far. They were avid observers of each other’s initiatives, keen 
learners from perceived good practice, but also creative political 
entrepreneurs of revised or new idea and practices that fed back into the 
dynamic loop and travelled further. They were not the proverbial passive 
norm receivers but active co-producers of the history of interwar fascism in 
all its contradictions and messy entanglements. 
It should be clear by now that my approach to ideational mobility and 
diffusion is not uni-directional or literalist. And while I do recognise that 
the genealogical history of fascism accords a special place to Italy, this is 
due to temporal sequence rather than any sense of de facto conceptual 
hierarchy. Fascism, Dobry noted, was the ‘product of the actions, struggles 
and the self-identification of the political actors themselves’.31 The right-
wing radical field was sparsely populated in the first half of the 1920s. This 
afforded a special status to those actors who first challenged conventional 
political norms and put in (successful, as it turned out) practice a repertoire 
of taboo-breaking propositions that were attractive to others abroad and 
easier to attract attention. Yet, as the field of radical right-wing politics 
became increasingly crowded and multifaceted in the late 1920s and 
especially 1930s, the flow of ideas became increasingly complex and 
tangled. Dynamic hierarchies did emerge in the process but not out of 
design or from some kind of fixed natural order. 1945 became the sort of 

































































historical terminus that ‘froze’ the busy landscape of ideational mobility 
and generated a potentially misleading snapshot of stasis and teleology for 
an ideology otherwise proudly flaunting its credentials as a radical open-
ended political phenomenon constantly in-the-making. 
The mobility paradigm offers a meaningful way to reverse the order of 
analysis - from outcomes to processes of formation; to expand the 
analytical field by re-integrating historical fragments usually excluded or 
ignored from the histories of a fascist ‘mainstream’; and to ask incisive 
questions about the history of interwar radical ideas and politics, of which 
‘fascism’ was a – distinct and critically important, to be sure – subset. In the 
following sections of this article, I navigate the complexities of the field of 
fascist mobilities by asking four key questions: why radical ideas travelled; 
what ideas and/or practices were involved in each diffusion instance and 
who the agents were in each case; how circulation occurred; and what 
outcomes (intended and actual) it produced in diverse temporal and spatial 
settings. 
Context and motivation: why was ‘fascism’ diffused?
The interwar period kicked off with a striking paradox. On the one hand, 
in the wake of WW1, liberalism extended its reach across Europe, with a 
number of new states that succeeded the collapsed empires moving along 
the path of democracy and enshrining an extended set of liberal rights in 
new constitutions.32 On the other hand, the fundamental assumptions of 
the liberal mainstream came under unprecedented sustained challenge by 
both the revolutionary left and the hyper-nationalist ‘old’ and especially 
‘new’ right; and it was this intersection that produced a crucial dynamic of 
increasingly vocal and aggressive contestation of liberal norms in the 
1920s/1930s.33 Right-wing nationalist resentment in particular at the post-
1918 promoted liberal-internationalist settlement targeted a series of 
political and social innovations: the new institutions of global cooperation 
(such as the fledgling League of Nations), the extension of parliamentary 
rule, the formalisation of a wider set of liberal rights into the constitutional 

































































order of an increasing circle of countries, and the normative legal 
protection extended to ethnic and religious minorities. In this respect, the 
rise and subsequent diffusion of fascism gave more concrete ideological 
and political expression to an already powerful sub-stratum of hyper-
nationalist/exclusionary backlash to both liberalism34 and the threat of 
revolutionary socialism,35 positing a radical nationalist counter-utopia to a 
(seemingly) mainstream liberal teleology of pluralism, growing empathy 
for an expanding circle of others, and pacifism. 
There was, however, one seismic event – with multiple chain reactions in 
its wake - that played a critical role in gave more concrete ideological 
substance and political expression to this rich but initially amorphous 
ferment of angry backlash. What happened in Italy from 1919 to 1922 was 
exceptional and deeply transformational, not only within the Italian 
context but also in an inter- and trans-national sense. The October 1922 
‘March on Rome' in particular became a ‘condensation symbol’, a symbolic 
performative - and tumultuous even in its immediate outcomes - event that 
very soon developed into a powerful icon of a new kind of radical politics 
well in Italy and beyond.36 The subsequent political consolidation of the 
Fascist dictatorship invested the symbol with the all-important aura of 
‘success’ that always strengthens a new norm’s diffusion dynamic.37 
Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, the later leader of the Iron Guard in Romania 
but in 1922 only a young radical nationalist agitator, wrote about the 
moment that the news of the March reached him, describing Mussolini as 
“one of us” and investing the event with a trans-national transformative 
significance by calling it “proof of the possibilities of victory”.38 Barely a 
month after the March on Rome, the leader of the then fledgling NSDAP 
Adolf Hitler was reportedly quoted saying “so it will be with us”,39 in an 
allusion to his intention to emulate the particular model of attempted take-
over in Germany.40
At the time of the ‘fascist’ diffusion, knowledge of ‘fascism’ was 
constructed through dual processes of interpretation by local agents and 
mediation by them. Therefore ‘fascism’ was understood and (re-
)constructed largely independently from whatever intentions and 
expectations its key leaders may have had, depending far more on the 

































































particular perceptions, interpretations, and expectations of the local 
entrepreneurs. Two main categories of local agents became involved in the 
diffusion of 'fascism' in the interwar period - fascist adherents who saw this 
'fascism' as the norm in toto (or as a more or less fixed set of organically 
interconnected norms) to be diffused locally as well transnationally; and 
more critical and selective norm entrepreneurs who perceived the 'fascist' 
external sources as a set of partly independent norms and inventive 
practices that could be appropriated and translated more flexibly and 
critically into their local context, on the basis of each one's perceived degree 
of cultural salience and capacity for facilitating better outcomes.41 In the 
former scenario, diffusion was driven to a significant degree by genuine 
fascination, often in spite of any forensic assessment of cultural match or 
any expectation of enhanced payoffs for them; whereas, in the latter case, it 
was principally a mechanism for maximising dividends and making the 
most in a situation of changed international conditions not of their own 
making. These agents ‘read fascism’ through their particular filters and 
made a critical input in the process of norm localisation, adapting the 
external reference to fit not just their own intentions but the particular 
cultural attributes of their national context and the audience that they may 
need to convince.42 All this does not mean that leaders of radical 
movements were instantly or unconditionally attracted to the allure of 
Fascism, however they chose to perceive it. In spite of their emotional bias, 
they remained supremely strategic political entrepreneurs who subjected 
external norms to scrutiny for their congruence and utility for their 
particular national context and audience. This said, conservative 
authoritarians like general-turned-politician Ioannis Metaxas in Greece 
(head of the ‘4th of August’ dictatorship in Greece in 1936-1941), Kārlis 
Ulmanis in Latvia (instigator of an anti-parliamentary coup in 1934), and 
Antonio Salazar (the prime minister of the Portuguese dictatorship with 
the longest term in office from 1932 to his death in 1974) adopted and 
adapted external ‘fascist’ norms on the basis of an alternative reading of 
their originally intentions and expected outcomes. For them, while some 
'fascist' norms appeared of dubious value or even potentially dangerous to 
them, others seemed eminently useful, albeit very often in ways that did 
not conform to the intentions of the norm initiators themselves. 

































































This last point also highlights a deeper paradox in the history of interwar 
fascism. While local radical nationalist agents appropriated and 
recontextualised external models of ‘fascism’ as an organisational, 
ideological, and political norm in their fight against the left, liberals, 
conservatives, and forces of the ‘old’ authoritarian right redeployed the 
diffused norms against local fascists themselves.43 In this scenario, the local 
actors’ engagement with ‘fascist’ norms was underpinned by a constructive 
and restraining rationale alike: on the one hand, the (however selective and 
qualified) translation of external norms generated or facilitated new modes 
of, and opportunities for, action; on the other hand, it was deployed as an 
acceptable alternative to current practices while also proscribing other, 
more radical options also suggested by the diffused external norms (in this 
case, the revolutionary ‘fascist' pathway). The list of examples is long: 
indicatively, Salazar crushed the Blueshirts in Portugal; Dollfuss used the 
momentum generated by the introduction of the one-party Ständestaat in 
1934-38 as a tool to defeat or contain the Austrian Nazis too; the abortive 
take-over attempt (a la March on Rome) by the Estonian Veterans (Vaps) in 
1934 prompted the controlled fascistisation of the regime headed by 
Konstantin Päts but also Vaps’s violent suppression; in Romania, the 
declaration of dictatorship by King Carol in 1937 and the fascistisation 
‘from above’ that he oversaw was combined with the violent crackdown on 
the Iron Guard. This form of pre-emptive and selective adoption of ‘fascist’ 
norms in order to deploy them (also) against the fascists themselves was 
part of a technique geared to ‘immunising’ the political status quo against 
more radical or revolutionary challenges.44
Agency and content: who diffused what ‘fascism’ exactly?
To say that ‘fascist’ ideas and/or political innovations travelled across 
Europe and beyond in the interwar years divulges very little about what 
was diffused. This is particularly problematic in the case of fascism for, 
unlike an authoritarian or dictatorial ‘wave’ (where outcomes can be 
benchmarked against a set of more conventional institutional and political 
expectations), mobilities of ‘fascism’ involved (i) exposure to novel taboo-

































































breaking ideological norms and political practices; and (ii) their reception 
and translation by a burgeoning circle of very different national, political, 
and social constituencies with bewilderingly different results. As a result, 
large ideological as well as political variations were recorded across 
different national contexts - and sometimes even within a single country. In 
addition, the diffusion of ‘fascism’ unfolded over a protracted period of 
time during which the meaning of both ‘fascist ideology’ (already 
notoriously multi-faceted as something akin to a ‘scavenger’) and ‘fascist 
rule' constantly evolved or mutated. While, for example, corporatism was 
the main ideological and political ware brandished by Italian Fascism in 
the second half of the 1920s and the early-1930s, it occupied a more 
marginal place in earlier years (and was largely associated with a militant 
anti-capitalist rhetoric that was abandoned once Mussolini came to power) 
and was largely eclipsed in the late-1930s.45 Meanwhile, the fact that 
antisemitism - so central a facet in the ideological profile of some 
movements such as National Socialism and the Iron Guard - was non-
existent as a discursive or political element in Italy and other case studies, 
at least until the mid-1930s,46 cast doubts on the benefits of an inclusive 
model of generic ‘fascism’ in interwar Europe.47 In fact, historians have 
never stopped debating whether particular case studies should be 
considered ‘fascist' and therefore whether they should be included in the 
histories of fascist diffusion or dismissed as ‘failed’ or ‘not-quite-fascist’ 
outcomes.48 The criteria used for distinction remain disputed and often 
controversial: typically, a genuinely revolutionary ideology; antisemitism; 
charismatic leadership; a radicalism that rejects traditional authoritarian 
sources; or para-militarism. Employing particular criteria results in rather 
different lists of ‘fascist’ cases and throws up all sorts of dichotomies – 
fascism versus authoritarianism, top-down versus bottom-up, movement 
versus regime, success versus failure, and so on. I would not suggest that 
such distinctions are without their heuristical value. Yet I find their rigid 
application to exclude discussion of non-normative entanglements between 
fascism and other expressions of radical politics in the interwar period both 
problematic and analytically impoverishing. As Roberts put it, we ‘need to 
loosen up on [distinctions] … and we may need more bases or axes of 
differentiation than fascism versus whatever else’.49

































































Therefore the question of what was diffused in the history of the circulation 
of fascist ideas and political innovations is far more complicated and 
important for the analysis of fascism’s diffusion than it may appear at first. 
Neither the precise content nor the agents involved nor their perceptions of 
what ‘fascism’ was nor their interpretations of the diffused content can be 
taken for granted, at any given moment and place or over a prolonged 
period of time. Even Italian Fascism agonised over producing its 
authoritative ideological statement. When such a statement did emerge, in 
1932 and in the elliptical form of The Doctrine of Fascism, it was introduced 
with a rather unusual caveat for an ideological manifesto as ‘action and 
thought … [with] an ideal content … [but also] a form linked to the 
contingencies of time and space”.50 David Roberts has reminded us that, 
when it came to the fore in the early 1920s, ‘fascism’ meant very little to 
contemporary audience, even within Italy; instead it followed “an 
uncertain, open-ended trajectory, partly because of the messiness of the 
Fascist mixture the heterogeneity of fuelling aspirations”.51 In the 1920s, 
this also affected Fascism's self-image and the ways in which its leadership 
communicated its core message outside of Italy. The Fascist regime used 
clandestine networks to support financially and politically revisionist states 
and fringe movements in other parts of Europe;52 but these early initiatives 
were mostly motivated by a pragmatic foreign policy aspirations and not 
from a conscious desire to diffuse 'Fascism' in a top-down manner as 
ideological and political ware. 
Throughout this period, Mussolini had wavered on the topic of Fascism's 
internationalisation;53 but by 1932 he had eventually decided that the 
future of Europe as a whole was ‘Fascist’, thereby actively re-branding 
Fascism as an export product with universal validity.54 No other fascist 
regime or movement – not even National Socialist Germany that conceived 
of its ‘new order’ project primarily as a pragmatic device of political 
hegemony55 - attempted something similar to Italian Fascism’s 
internationalisation project. Ironically too, the decisive momentum for the 
launch of Fascism's project of international diffusion came in the wake of 
Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in 1933 and the rapid deterioration of 
the relations between the two regimes in 1934. What became known as the 

































































Action Committees for the Universality of Rome (Comitati d’Azione per 
l’Universalità di Roma, CAUR)56 spearheaded an official effort, supported by 
regular international conferences, meetings, visits, and other kinds of 
informal contact, to diffuse ‘fascism’ beyond the Italian borders. Note the 
chosen name for the organisation, however - without a single mention of 
this ‘fascism’, the regime's projected self-image used the twin synecdoches 
of spiritual romanità and corporatism as the drivers of its project of 
ideological diffusion.57 The initiative, starting with a promising founding 
meeting held at Montreux, Switzerland in December 1934 (to which Nazi 
Germany was deliberately not invited), had mixed fortunes (especially 
concerning resistance to the chosen ideological platform of 'Roman 
universality’, which was more amenable to Mediterranean ‘Latin’ countries 
than their central and northern European counterparts) before gradually 
running out of steam and being officially abandoned by 1938-39.58 
Diffusion, however, is rarely a tidy one-sided linear process of norm 
externalisation by an initiator directed at local passive receivers. The initial 
line of defence used by local fascists and conservative actors who 
collaborated one way or another with the Nazi designs that they 
succumbed to external pressure or had no other alternative than to be seen 
to subscribe to the radical political agenda of Hitler’s regime in order to 
avoid a hostile Nazi take-over (essentially the argument made by Marshall 
Petain, head of the Vichy regime in France) neither saved collaborationist 
leaders from postwar trials nor stood up to historical scrutiny ever since.59 
Meanwhile, similar assumptions that the transnational diffusion of anti-
Jewish persecution and later participation in the ‘Final Solution’ were 
attributable to German - direct or implicit - pressure also proved to be 
exaggerated or misleading, masking a reality of willing and unforced 
collaboration on numerous occasions.60 More often than not then diffusion 
started on the initiative of local or transnational agents, regardless or in 
spite of the intentions of the norm initiators themselves. The process 
involved complex and unpredictable reciprocal interactions between the 
perceived norms themselves and any trans-national entrepreneurs and 
active local agents who selected, re-interpreted, adapted, resisted or even 
rejected the ‘fascist’ norms.61 

































































The very different attitudes displayed by local agents to antisemitism in the 
1920s and 1930s is an interesting example of this dynamic relationship 
between external norms and active (re-)interpretation by diverse 
contemporary local agents. In France, for example, the existence of a 
complex national tradition of socio-economic and cultural antisemitism 
resulted not in a uniform acceptance of antisemitism by different ‘fascist' 
movements but in a wide range of responses ranging from strong 
ideological attachment to near-rejection. In the 1920s, the Faisceau did not 
officially adopt antisemitism, even if many of its leaders and members – 
including Valois himself - had a notable antisemitic past from their days in 
the Action Française, but showed a strong interest in social corporatism 
and the performative aspects of Fascist ‘style’.62 Antisemitism also held a 
dubious position in the official ideology of the Solidarité Française, which 
nevertheless propagated intensely xenophobic and racist views.  
Francisme, the movement founded by Marcel Bucard, juggled official 
denunciations of the doctrine of antisemitism (and rejected altogether the 
Nazi biological variant) with strong anti-Jewish sentiments within its 
ranks.63 In the 1930s new movements generally displayed mixed attitudes 
to antisemitism, with the Croix de Feu and later the Parti Social Français 
(PSF), headed by Francois de La Rocque, as well as Jacques Doriot's Parti 
Populaire Français originally displaying an aversion to the Nazi-inspired 
rhetoric of biological antisemitism, opting instead for a more selective and 
strategic invocation of the tradition of cultural antisemitism and with an 
increasing focus on the Blum government and financial corruption.64 
While, however, La Rocque eventually turned against the Vichy regime in 
the 1940s and rejected the introduction of radical anti-Jewish legislation 
largely influenced by the Nazi racial and legal norms, Doriot re-invented 
himself as a pillar of Nazi collaboration and a strong support for an even 
more radical implementation of Nazi ideology and the ‘Final Solution’ in 
France than what was being attempted by the Vichy regime.65 Clearly 
attitudes to antisemitism, cultural/economic and biological, were 
changeable and refracted through broader political calculations, be that 
questions of foreign policy or of the need to appeal to settlers in north 
Africa. 

































































When it came to corporatism, the striking circulation of corporatist ideas 
from the second half of the 1920s onwards may have been propelled by the 
novelty of the Italian Carta del Lavoro and the systematic propaganda efforts 
of the Fascist regime to promote it as the most innovative differentiator of 
the Fascist ‘third way’; but in the end its diffusion dynamic or absence 
thereof in other countries was largely shaped by the perceptions and 
actions of local norm entrepreneurs. It is easy to identify the shared 
impulse for nearly all local actors in the introduction of social and/or 
political corporatist experiments - the iconoclastic desire to make a clean 
break with both liberal parliamentary institutions and socialist 
organisational norms that ‘fascism’ had sought to supplant and replace 
with an organic new system of economic organisation and political 
representation to fill the vacuum. But while social corporatist innovations 
were largely shaped by local adaptations of the innovative precedent of the 
earlier Italian model, when it came to corporatist legislative systems the 
diffusion equation was far more complex and varied. Not only was Fascist 
Italy a relatively late-comer in this respect (the Fascist corporatist 
parliament was only introduced in the late-1930s) but other factors such as 
the particular local input of traditional institutions such as the Catholic 
Church, the conservative elites, and the military forced compromises that 
affected the final shape of the experiment. Salazar’s Estado Novo in Portugal 
and Dollfuss’s Ständestaat in Austria - both taking shape in 1933-34 - also 
occupied an important role in the diffusion process, functioning as both 
receivers of prior ‘fascist’ innovations and sources of autonomous 
inspiration for new channels of diffusion that extended throughout the 
1930s and the war years. 
3. Process: how diffusion took shape and place 
Diffusion operates both in space and over time.66 Exposure to new norms is 
commonly the first all-important step in this process. Awareness of new 
ideas and practices is the essential starting point of any diffusion process. 
This is then followed by a local agent-led assessment and selection, often 
on the basis of their subjective perceptions and interests but also in relation 

































































to the peculiarities of the domestic context in which these local agents 
operate. Whereas ‘early adopters’ are more likely to change their 
behaviour early in spite of the absence of evidence that others are doing the 
same, those engaging with the process at subsequent stages of the curve 
(‘early majority’, ‘late majority’) indicate a higher sensitivity to how other 
members of the local or international network behave before calibrating 
their attitude and behaviour.67 The parabola of ‘fascism’s’ diffusion in the 
interwar years followed a very similar pattern, with only a modest uptake 
in the still uncertain 1920s that extended decisively upwards only in 1933-
34, in the wake of Hitler’s appointment as chancellor, and continued to 
gather adherents until well into WW2 before petering out (and actually 
becoming reversed in 1944-45 in the shadow of an impending crushing 
defeat for the Axis). 
Finally the external norms are subjected to complex processes of norm 
operationalisation to suit its new local context. This third stage describes 
the active, again local agent-led processes of bestowing external norms 
with local resonance and utility through enhancing their perceived 
compatibility with pre-existing local particularities. In this process, 
diffusion becomes a set of processes of not just replication or faithful 
translation of the prototype but of creative co-production of (new) hybrid 
norms to suit local conditions and expectations.68 In the context of interwar 
fascism, this phase was particularly important and complex, for ‘fascism’ 
was above all a nationalist ideology and thus any suspicion that fascist 
movements sought to emulate an external (that is, foreign) source would be 
inherently at variance with its ideological origins and nature.69 When the 
Spanish dictator Primo de Rivera was asked whether he had been inspired 
by Mussolini's March on Rome in his 1923 successful coup against the 
Spanish Republic, he invoked instead domestic national sources of 
reference instead (the nineteenth-century General Juan Prim who had been 
a major instigator of coups against the monarchy; and the rural 
paramilitary formations of the Somatén in the immediate post-WW1 years, 
to explain his seeming admiration for Mussolini and Fascist Italy.70 The 
leader of the French Faisceau went even further down this path, claiming 
that his movement’s seemingly ‘fascist’ ideas that suggested borrowing 

































































from Fascist Italy were actually pioneered by him and his movement in 
France and then diffused to Italy.71 Meanwhile Swedish fascists showed 
astute awareness of the danger of being branded fascist ‘copycats’, first by 
adapting selectively norms developed in Italy, then by refashioning their 
ideological profile in proximity to the Nazi racialist doctrine, and finally by 
jettisoning discursive references to ‘fascism’ in the late 1930s in a response 
to an increasingly hostile public opinion.72
Balancing admiration for foreign ‘fascist’ leaders and political innovations 
with the need to constantly shake off any suspicion of emulating 
prototypes alien to national tradition and culture was no mean task for 
leaders of movements and regimes inspired by aspects of the ‘fascist’ 
experience elsewhere. One of the most common techniques in this direction 
involved creative onomatopoeic solutions for national movements. Primo’s 
son, José Antonio, co-founded the Falange Española in the autumn of 1933, 
initially choosing the cryptic acronym ‘F.E.’ but shortly afterwards 
clarifying that it did not stand for ‘Fascismo Español’ and opting instead 
for the word ‘Falange’ that had more resonance in Spanish culture and 
history. Later, José Antonio declared in the Spanish parliament that “we 
have entered the world at a time that fascism is prevailing - and this … 
handicaps us more than it favours us, for fascism has a series of 
interchangeable inflections that we do not all wish to adopt”. He did not 
deny that the Falange had adapted ‘fascist' elements but he defended these 
points of inspiration by describing them as permanent in moral validity 
and universal in character.73 
This kind of justification was also used by Oswald Mosley in 1932, when he 
fused his own New Party with the British Fascisti and the Imperial Fascist 
League (IFL) to form the British Union of Fascists (BUF). In contrast, 
however, to José Antonio, Mosley did not shy away from adopting the 
noun ‘fascism’ in the official name of his party and in referring to his 
movement and future government as ‘F(f)ascist’.74 In a BBC interview he 
gave just before announcing the fusion of the parties, he insisted, echoing 
Mussolini, that fascism was the dominant creed of the century and 
universal in its ideological foundations; but he also claimed that this same 
‘fascism’ was shaped into “practical national expression in each country”.75 

































































Mosley sought to internalise Fascist symbols and cultural points of 
reference by presenting them as rooted in a transcultural continuum of 
historical greatness in which Britain had always occupied a central role. 
Unsurprisingly then, the thrust of Mosley’s project of localising the ‘fascist' 
political norms in the British context involved the re-conceptualisation of 
empire as the undisputed political, spiritual, cultural, and moral hub of the 
BUF's regenerative project76. But even the adoption of the symbol of the 
fasces - and, more broadly, of the imperial legacy of ancient Rome - was 
presented as supremely salient to British traditions by presenting the 
British Empire as the 'custodian’ of a millennia-long ‘tradition of 
civilisation and progress” rooted in the classical past.77 
In contrast to the only limited adoption of the adjective ‘fascist’ in the 
onomatopoeic conventions of kindred movements and parties, the 
designation ‘national socialist’ proved markedly more popular and 
seemingly less troubling to local norm adopters. Anton Mussert’s National 
Socialism Movement in The Netherlands and Fritz Clausen’s Danish 
National Socialist Workers’ Party were only two - and arguably the most 
successful - of a far longer and varied in national dispersal list of parties 
taking up a variant of this designation, usually appearing in the late-1920s 
or early-1930s. While in a large number of cases the name was adopted 
deliberately to declare strong ideological affinity and political identification 
with Hitler’s movement and regime in the 1930s, the naming convention 
was not a bizarre neologism like ‘fascism’, with its two adjectives 
individually and combined in a composite phrase possessing a more easily 
defensible universal meaning independently from German National 
Socialism. When it came to conjuring up racialism, the schemas of the 
‘Nordic race’ and of the ‘Aryan’ theories of racial superiority also 
referenced broader ideological legacies that predated the rise of German 
National Socialism, pointed to a rich and long-standing international body 
of pseudo-research in support of such arguments, and had already 
developed some traction in a number of Northern European societies.78
In justifying the adoption of particular ‘fascist’ norms, the bulk of ‘fascist’ 
movements in interwar Europe responded to actual or anticipated 
criticisms of ‘foreign’ mimicry by engaging consciously with two principal 

































































techniques of norm localisation. First, the external norm was ‘framed’ - as a 
novel, fuller or better solution – in reference to a wider, more easily 
internalisable ‘problem’ with both transnational and local resonance.79 So, 
for example, Mosley localised his understanding of the ‘Fascism’ norm by 
articulating a contrast between a present-past of national degeneration 
(caused by the weaknesses of liberalism, corruption, lack of national vision; 
and the perceived corrosive effects of every form of internationalism, 
including socialism, ‘immoral’ capitalism, ‘Jewish conspiracies’ etc) and an 
alternative present-future pathway of national rebirth, based on ‘fascism’, 
empire, militarism, and strong executive leadership. Even when it came to 
controversial decisions, such as the adoption of the ‘fascist’ black shirt as 
the official uniform of the party, Mosley responded to escalating criticisms 
of foreign mimicry80 by invoking an alleged neutral universalised 
symbology behind this decision (e.g. uniform as classless unity, attack on 
bourgeois values, show of ‘manhood’ etc).81 Thus Mosley attempted to 
reverse-engineer ‘fascism’ as a global framework of problem-solving with 
regard to issues of interconnected national and inter-/trans-national 
salience. 
Second, once justified, the new adapted norm was ‘grafted’ onto existing 
local traditions and norms, either by supplementing or by displacing 
them.82 The most effective local norm diffusion agents understood how 
important this step was, spending significant discursive capital in forging 
historical and cultural genealogies that linked the chosen external with 
both universal and purely sources or local points of reference. This 
explains, for example, the diversity of historical references in the ideology 
and discourse of diverse fascist movements: the Verdinaso in Belgium 
spoke of its vision of reconstituting the medieval kingdom of Burgundy;83 
Szalasi's Arrow Cross evangelised the recreation of a great ‘Carpatho-
Danubian fatherland' along the lines of medieval Hungarian kingdom;84 
the Croat Ustasha linked 'Aryanism' with their historical status as alleged 
outpost of western Christianity against either (Ottoman) Islam of eastern 
Orthodox peoples (Serbs being presented as the arch-enemy of modern 
Croat nationalism);85 in the fiercely contested marketplace of national and 
historical traditions in the post-WW1 Austrian republic, the Heimwehr 

































































mostly threw its weight behind a Habsburg and Catholic genealogy of 
modern Austria while the Austrian NSDAP subsumed and updated the 
long tradition of territorial pan-German nationalism.86 
These examples highlight how local agents employed inventively both re-
interpretation and re-constitution of the external norms as part of their 
strategy of localisation. Acharya noted how norm-takers seek to enhance 
the norm’s congruence with its new coordinates of space (local context) and 
time (the particular register of challenges that its diffusion seeks to address 
at a given moment). 87 This means that very often the local agent may have 
to convincingly articulate not only why the external norm is supremely 
suited for in its new context but also why it may change form, meaning, 
and function without losing its association with the original external 
prototype. When Codreanu defended his movement's focus on aggressive 
antisemitism even in the face of its notable absence (until that point…) in 
Fascist Italy that he had so highly praised as a source of ideological 
reference, he explained:
Italy has as many Jews as Romania has Ciangai in the Siret valley. An Italian 
anti-Semitic movement would be as if Romanians started a movement 
against the Ciangai. But had Mussolini lived in Romania he could not but be 
anti-Semitic, for fascism means first of all defending your nation against the 
dangers that threaten it. … In Romania, fascism could only mean … the 
removal of the Jewish threat and the clearing of the path to the survival and 
glory to which Romanians are entitled to aspire.88
This process of adaptive localisation cannot be reduced to a simple matter 
of reception. Selective adoption, translation, and instrumentalization of 
external norms were supremely creative processes, generative of essentially 
new norms for others to observe and interact with. One of the most striking 
examples of a ‘wave’ of diverse localisations of a single new radical, taboo-
breaking norm concerned the widespread accommodation and adaptation 
of the ‘Nuremberg canon’ of racial/anti-Jewish persecution by a rapidly 
expanding circle of regimes in Europe from the late-1930s onwards. Each of 
them engaged in either pruning and fusing or both, thereby producing 
interesting variations refracted through particular local peculiarities and 
historical legacies. The three Hungarian laws introduced in 1938, 1939, and 

































































1941 respectively used the - particularly resonant in Hungary - filter of 
religious conversion as a key device: the first law completely excluded 
converted Jews from the restrictive legislation, the second introduced some 
restrictions to the award of this preferential status, while the third 
abandoned it altogether and adopted for the first time a large portion of the 
Nazi racial rationale.89 A similar trajectory was followed in Romania in 
1938, with two pieces of anti-Jewish legislation following the Nuremberg 
citizenship canon - the first allowing for exceptions on the basis of proving 
Romanian descent while the second removing this route to exception and 
incorporating racialist principles. In wartime Slovakia, the introduction of 
the so-called Jewish Codex diffused the majority of norms underpinning 
the Nazi Nuremberg legislation but went even further by adding a further 
requirement for half- or even one-quarter Jews who continued to practise 
the Jewish faith.90 But the example of the Independent State of Croatia is 
perhaps the most revealing with regard to the dynamics of expanding the 
diffused norm in an originally unanticipated direction by its pioneers. The 
Ustasha-led regime introduced a cascade of legislation inspired by the Nazi 
’Nuremberg model’ in the summer and autumn of 1941. Among them, the 
racial re-definition of Jewish citizenship extended even further than the NS 
Nuremberg stipulations, targeting also ‘half-Jews’, illegitimate children, 
offspring of unmarried Jewish women, and spouses regardless of their own 
‘racial’ makeup. It also introduced a distinction between Jews born in the 
territories of Independent Croatia and/or by parents residing there and 
those who were not. In addition, however, the Ustasha regime directed the 
main thrust of its vicious eliminationist campaign to the new state’s large 
Serb minority and imputed distinct cultural canons of performative raw 
violence in its execution that departed markedly from the industrialised 
modernity of the Nazi project.91 
4. Outcome: what the diffusion of ‘fascist’ norms actually 
produced
When it comes to the fourth stage of the diffusion process, the outcomes, the 
original intentions of the local agents cannot pre-determine the actual 

































































upshots of a diffusion process and cannot prevent different, often 
undesirable consequences. When King Carol II of Romania introduced a set 
of radical changes in the operation of the political system in 1937 by 
adapting a set of norms inspired by external ‘fascist’ norms, his primary 
motivation was to pre-empt a further strengthening of the Iron Guard that 
could threaten his authority. Thus by suspending elections and the 
parliamentary system, by revising the constitution in a hybrid 
authoritarian-fascist direction (including the introduction of a corporatist 
system), by instituting radical methods of violent persecution of the 
country’s Jews, by adopting para-military paraphernalia including Iron 
Guard-like uniforms, and eventually by outlawing the Legionaries and 
arresting their leaders (Codreanu was executed shortly afterwards), Carol 
expected that he would neutralise the growing danger posed by the Iron 
Guard.92 
Similar concerns about the growing militancy and power of the Austrian 
National Socialists (DNSAP) in the wake of Hitler’s appointment as 
chancellor, as well as a decision to force a showdown with the powerful 
socialist left, provided the pretext for Dollfuss to install a ‘Christian 
corporatist’ dictatorship in 1933.93 The experiment soon morphed into a 
one-party system, in alliance with the ‘fascist’ Heimwehr but in explicit 
opposition to the DNSAP that was banned.94 In both cases, the strategy 
delivered short-term payoffs that were soon reversed with catastrophic 
consequences for the two dictators: the Iron Guard was weakened but 
managed to resurfarce in 1940-41, this time (briefly) even as a government 
partner; the DNSAP was also disrupted but nevertheless attempted a 
violent coup in 1934, during which Dollfuss was assassinated, and despite 
its continued proscription under Dollfuss's successor Kurt von 
Schuschnigg managed to remain part of the power equation until 1938, 
when Germany decided to force the annexation of Austria into the German 
Reich.95 Thus pre-emptive ‘fascistisation’ from above did not deliver what 
either Carol of Dollfuss-Schuschnigg had originally expected: it did not 
secure their power in the longer term or eliminate the threat of their 
‘fascist' opponents as they had originally intended.96 

































































As noted earlier, historians of interwar fascism have encountered heuristic 
and classificatory problems when dealing with such hybrid regimes that 
engaged with a controlled, selective, and limited introduction of ‘fascist’ 
norms from above. Neither ‘fascist’ - in the sense of being driven by a truly 
revolutionary project or possessing the ideological and organisational 
cohesion to drive radical change - nor ‘authoritarian’ - in the form of a 
more traditional dictatorship aimed at demobilisation of the masses -, these 
“radical right regimes with fascist trappings”97 have for too long treated as 
marginal or aberrant in the history of ‘fascism' even as they occupied such 
an important place in the history of ‘fascism's' diffusion in interwar 
Europe. Originally labelled as 'failed’ or ‘incomplete' against the 
benchmarks of the presumed prototypical ‘fascism' of National Socialist 
Germany and Fascist Italy, in the last three decades they have gradually 
moved from their earlier pariah status to, first, a partial rehabilitation as 
hybrid political regimes and, more recently, to a re-integration into the core 
of fascism studies.98 A similar label of failure was reserved for ‘fascist' 
movements that, while deemed to belong to the ideological universe of 
interwar fascism, fell short of developing mass following, electoral success 
or achieving the prize of political power that would have allowed them to 
implement their programme of radical change in their local contexts.99 
Nevertheless, if the focus shifts momentarily from actual outcomes to the 
rational and process of diffusion, then these two categories of putatively 
‘failed’ fascist case studies acquire fresh historical significance and become 
objects of enquiry. Closer attention to the rationale and intended goals of 
the local agents rather than to a direct comparison with the outcomes of 
other case studies is essential as it helps nuance and calibrate the heuristic 
benchmarks of 'success' when it comes to the diffusion process. Weyland 
has outlined four main outcomes in a diffusion process: norm replication 
lies at the one end of the spectrum of outcomes and norm blockage at the 
other, with pre-emptive and abortive emulation occupying interim points 
along the way. The latter two outcomes are indicative of a distance 
between the original norm and the particular outcome of norm diffusion in 
a given context. Pre-emptive emulation is invested with both ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ value by the local agents, intended as selective and partial 

































































emulation of the norm itself but also deliberately aiming at severing it from 
its more radical consequences observed elsewhere. Abortive emulation, by 
contrast, results from an actual mismatch between intention and outcome, 
the latter falling significantly short of the benchmarks set by the former.100 
While many cases of ‘fascist' movements that failed to gain any significant 
traction within their local societies could be viewed as examples of abortive 
emulation, a lot of the hybrid fascist-authoritarian dictatorships that were 
headed by unlikely conservative figures in the interwar years (e.g. 
Salazar’s, Dollfuss’s or Metaxas’s dictatorships) presented mixed patterns 
of pre-emptive emulation by design and abortive emulation in terms of 
(some at least of) their outcomes. 
To assume that the default intention of the local agents was a more or less 
close replication of the external norm is misleading. After all, a large part of 
the historical enquiry into the dynamics of radical norm diffusion in the 
interwar years offered in this article involves cases of partial contestation or 
constructive localisation that resulted in a series of intended departures 
from the original norm. Contestation was undoubtedly far more 
pronounced among conservative-authoritarian elite local agents who 
approached norm diffusion as largely a pre-emptive move aimed at 
neutralising the 'fascist' radical challenge. However, even the usually far 
more sympathetic radical nationalist agitators who experienced genuine 
fascination with the external norm and in principle desired its faithful 
replication in their local context did sometimes display more critical 
attitudes to the external norm. At the 1934 Montreux conference, otherwise 
supremely sympathetic ‘fascist' participants evinced a degree of unease 
with CAUR's 'universality of Rome' formula, even as they wholeheartedly 
agreed with the benefits of the bulk of norms pioneered by Fascist Italy.101 
Thus the intended outcomes may end up differing from those of the 
original norm - and, when they occur, such divergences should be 
regarded as successful instances of localisation rather than as 'abortive' 
replications thereof. In addition, localisation is a dynamic ongoing process 
that does not exclude subsequent re-calibrations in order to further 
maximise the resonance of diffused norms in the local context. Even 
someone as central to the historical narratives of ‘fascism’s’ diffusion as 

































































Hitler spent most of the 1920s in political wilderness, having failed to 
emulate the March on Rome in 1923 or to achieve electoral or political 
traction for the NSDAP until 1929.102 In the process, he was often forced to 
change his political strategy and communication in order to increase the 
political and social appeal of his movement for the audience of Weimar 
Germany. As Christian Goeschel has convincingly demonstrated, the 
relationship with Mussolini and Italian Fascism was a dynamic amalgam of 
a sense of ideological affinity and functional calculation. The Hitler of the 
first half of the 1920s balanced his personal admiration for the Italian 
dictator against his selective pragmatic approach to Fascist ideology and 
political initiatives. At times, juggling his strategic use of the Italian 
precedent, as well as deploying (adapted) signifiers indebted to Fascism, 
for his own political benefit against accusations of being a Fascist copycat 
proved awkward and landed him in trouble. Yet, while the political 
formation of the NSDAP in the 1920s makes little sense outside the broader 
context of European radical politics dominated at the time by Fascist Italy, 
the ideological development of National Socialism was only partly and 
tangentially indebted to it. Mussolini’s Fascism was more useful to Hitler 
as a discursive reference than as an ideological compass.103
Conclusions: diffusion analysis and the transnational approach to 
fascism
Shortly after violently repressing the Iron Guard in January 1941, general 
Antonescu described to the Romanian press the character of his new 
regime:
This state shall base its policies on the primacy of Romanianism in all 
domains of life. I pledge to unhesitatingly enforce all reforms necessary for 
the elimination of foreign influences and the safeguarding of our national 
interest. The struggle of the grand German National Socialist revolution and 
fascist achievements shall serve as guideposts of experience to be adapted to 
Romanian needs in order to graft on our realities the new world supported 
by the achievements in organization of these peoples.104 

































































Here then, in a nutshell, was a snapshot of all the alleged ‘contradictions’ 
often highlighted by the historiography of fascism that an unlikely local 
agent reconciled in the space of a few words, without registering any sense 
of tension or awareness of incompatibility between the diverse components 
of the statement. ’Romanianisation’ as the primary policy objective of 
Antonescu’s new hybrid dictatorship post-January 1941 was an anti-Jewish 
and anti-minority platform indebted to hyper-nationalist, anti-liberal, 
exclusionary, and eliminationist norms pioneered - in different ways - in 
both Germany and Italy. It was guided by their precedent, with their 
‘achievements’ ‘grafted’ on Romanian ‘realities’ but also refracted through 
the prism of distinct ‘Romanian needs’ and producing a hybrid norm. Here 
was a distinctly Romanian hybrid form of ‘fascism’, headed by a 
conservative general who had nevertheless been exposed to the external 
‘fascist’ precedent and used the filter of ‘cultural fit’ to translate and adapt 
them for his local context while also promoting his ‘positive’ goals (his 
political calculations for enhancing his power and advancing what he 
perceived as Romanian interests through an even closer alignment with the 
Axis). ‘Fascism’, even in its radical innovations pioneered by Fascist Italy 
or its subsequent spectacularly radical manifestations in National Socialist 
Germany, was not - and was not regarded by contemporary observers - as 
a universal scripture. 
In this article, I have argued that a dynamic, decentred, and non-literalist 
mobility paradigm of analysis offer a welcome extension of the heuristic 
power of transnational approaches to interwar fascism. It complements the 
significant insights gained through sophisticated conceptual studies 
regarding the origins and essence of fascist ideology by making them less 
rigid and prescriptive, more flexible and analytically useful. It also 
promotes a better understanding of the dynamic channels of inter- and 
trans-national circulation of radical ideas and practices in the interwar 
years. If we accept that interwar fascism was a phenomenon with 
international reach driven by the appeal and circulation of a set of generic 
ideological norms and political practices, then our models of 
interpretations must accommodate alternative local interpretations, 
adaptations, and a wide range of varied outcomes in the process of their 

































































translation and operationalisation in each case. The history of interwar 
fascism was shaped, incrementally and cumulatively, by a multitude of 
local agents who crucially depended on one another, caught in a far wider 
web of interactions and entanglements than previously assumed.105 Its 
projection into history was not a simple matter of ‘successful’ diffusion of a 
core ideology outwards and of ‘abortive’ instances branded as not-quite-
fascism; instead ‘fascism’ emerged from the debris of 1945 as the messy net 
force of diverse, multivalent agencies, of interactions and frictions, in the 
end of trial and error. 
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